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Abstract
Fine-grained memory protection for C and C++ programs
must track individual objects (or pointers), and store bounds
information per object (or pointer). Its cost is dominated
by metadata updates and lookups, making efficient metadata
management the key for minimizing performance impact. Ex-
isting approaches reduce metadata management overheads by
sacrificing precision, breaking binary compatibility by chang-
ing object memory layout, or wasting space with excessive
alignment or large shadow memory spaces.
We propose FRAMER, a software capability model with ob-
ject granularity. Its efficient per-object metadata management
mechanism enables direct access to metadata by calculating
their location from a tagged pointer to the object and a
compact supplementary table, and has potential applications
in memory safety, type safety, thread safety and garbage
collection. FRAMER improves over previous solutions by
simultaneously (1) streamlining expensive metadata lookups,
(2) offering flexibility in metadata placement and size, (3)
saving space by removing superfluous alignment and padding,
and (4) avoiding internal object memory layout changes. We
evaluate FRAMER with a use case on memory protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite advances in software defenses, exploitation of
systems code written in unsafe languages such as C and
C++ is still possible. Security exploits use memory safety
vulnerabilities to corrupt or leak sensitive data, and hijack a
vulnerable program’s logic. In response, several defenses have
been proposed for making software exploitation hard.
Current defenses fall in two basic categories: those that
let memory corruption happen, but harden the program to
prevent exploitation, and those that try to detect and block
memory corruption in the first place. For instance, Control-
flow Integrity (CFI) [1], [14], [20], [36], [39], [47], [48], [49],
[55], [56], [57] contains all control flows in a statically com-
puted Control-flow Graph (CFG), while Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) hides the available CFG when the
process executes. Both approaches can offer only probabilistic
security [15], [44], since memory corruption is still possible,
albeit exploitation is much harder.
A general approach to detect and block memory corruption
is through tracking the bounds of object allocations [3],
[5], [13], [16], [19], [21], [23], [26], [33], [34], [35], [41],
[54]. The program is instrumented accordingly to use bounds
information for blocking unintended accesses to objects. These
systems can offer deterministic guarantees, since now memory
corruption is prevented in the first place, however tracking all
objects (or pointers) incurs heavy performance overheads.
Some existing techniques trade off compatibility for high
locality of reference, however, it is desirable to minimise the
disruption owing to tacit assumptions by programmers and
compatibility with existing code or libraries that cannot be
recompiled. In particular, so-called fat pointers [35] impose
incompatibility issues with external modules, especially pre-
compiled libraries in software-based solutions.
With these limitations in mind, object-capability models
[9], [28], [50], [51] using hardware-supported tags become
very attractive, because they can manage compatibility and
control runtime costs. But they are not supported in today’s
mainstream processor architectures, and, more importantly,
cannot entirely avoid undesirable overheads such as metadata
management related memory accesses just by virtue of being
hardware-based.
In this paper, we present FRAMER, a software-based ca-
pability model using tagged pointers for fast metadata access.
FRAMER provides efficient and flexible per-object metadata
management that enables direct access to metadata by calcu-
lating their location using the (currently) unused top 16 bits
of a 64-bit pointer to the object and a supplementary table.
The key considerations behind FRAMER are as follows.
Firstly, FRAMER enables the memory manager freedom
to place metadata in the associated header near the object
to maximise spatial locality, which has positive effects at all
levels of the memory hierarchy. Headers can vary in size,
unlike approaches that store the header at a system-wide
fixed offset from the object, which may be useful in some
applications. Headers can also be shared over object instances
(although we do not develop that aspect in this paper). Our
evaluation shows excellent D-cache performance where the
performance impact of software checking is, to a fair extent,
mitigated by improved instructions per cycle (IPC).
Secondly, the address of the header holding metadata is
derived from tagged pointers regardless of objects’ alignment.
We use a novel technique to encode the relative location of the
header in unused bits at the top of a pointer. This streamlines
metadata lookup, which has been the performance bottleneck
of deterministic memory safety approaches. Moreover, the
encoding is such, that despite being relative to the address in
the pointer, the tag does not require updating when the address
in the pointer changes. A supplementary table is used only for
cases where the location information cannot be directly ad-
dressed with the additional 16-bits in the pointer. The address
of the corresponding entry in the table is also calculated from
our tagged pointer. This table is small compared to typical
shadow memory implementations.
Thirdly, we avoid wasting memory from excessive padding
and superfluous alignment, by encoding and using relative
location for metadata access. Whereas existing approaches
using shadow space [3], [17], [28], [33], [41] re-align or group
objects to avoid conflicts in entries, FRAMER provides great
flexibility in alignment, that completely removes constraining
the objects or memory. The average of space overheads of our
approach is 20% for full checking despite the generous size
of metadata in our current implementation.
Fourthly, our approach facilitates compatibility. Our tag is
encoded in otherwise unused bits at the top of a pointer, but
the pointer size is unchanged and contiguity can be ensured.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We present an encoding technique for relative offsets that
is interesting in its own right. It is both compact and
also avoids imposing object alignment or size constraints.
Moreover, it is favourable for hardware implementation
and may find uses across different application domains.
• We design, implement and evaluate FRAMER, a generic
framework for fast and practical object-metadata manage-
ment with potential applications in memory safety, type
safety and garbage collection.
• We present a case study of applying FRAMER to the
problem of spatial memory safety, using our framework
to allow inexpensive validation of pointer dereferences.
We further discuss some kinds of violations of temporal
safety that FRAMER prevents, and a potential application
for type confusion prevention.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss techniques to detect memory
errors. Static analysis detects errors at compile time and does
not introduce run-time overhead, but must inevitably be over-
conservative, giving false alarms. In this paper, we focus only
on run-time verification, but with compile-time assistance.
A. Metadata Association
Several approaches have been proposed for tracking mem-
ory and detecting memory-related errors. We review here
systems that either track objects or pointers.
1) Object-based Tracking: An object-based approach stores
bounds information per object. By not changing the memory
layout of objects, it offers compatibility with current source
and pre-compiled legacy libraries. In addition to checking
pointer dereferences, these approaches may check pointer
arithmetic to avoid losing track of the intended referent [23],
or otherwise risk false negatives for some spatial violations
that stride over object boundaries. Moreover, object-based
approaches checking pointer arithmetic should take special
care to avoid false positives for valid out-of-bound pointers
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Fig. 1: Embedded Metadata: P, UB, and LB represent a pointer itself,
upper bound, and lower bound, respectively.
that are never dereferenced. Object-based approaches usually
omit tracking of sub-objects such as an array member of a
structure.
Due to the arbitrary size of objects, these approaches require
some form of range-based lookup of objects using an in-bound
address, which can be more expensive than a simple lookup.
An early approach used a splay tree to reduce the overhead
[23], but more efficient systems simplify the lookup by using
table access to shadow memory regions. We will discuss the
details in Section II-B.
2) Pointer-based tracking: Pointer-based approaches asso-
ciate bounds information with pointers. Per-pointer metadata
holds the valid range that a pointer is allowed to point to.
Unlike object-based approaches, this enables them to detect
internal overflows easier, such as an array out-of-bounds inside
a structure, so pointer-based approaches can guarantee near
complete memory safety. One drawback is the additional
runtime overhead from metadata copy and update at pointer
assignment, while object-based approaches update metadata
only at memory allocation/release. In addition, the number
of pointers can be larger than that of allocated objects, so
pointer-intensive programs may suffer from heavier runtime
overheads.
B. Metadata Storage
Memory safety enforcement techniques fall into two cate-
gories depending on whether metadata is disjoint or embedded
in each object or pointer.
1) Embedded Metadata:
a) Fat Pointers: Fat pointers [5], [22], [35] embed
metadata in each pointer as shown in Fig. 1a. They provide
speed with the highest locality of references by avoiding extra
memory access for metadata update/retrieval, however, they
break binary compatibility due to expansion of the pointer
representation. In addition, fat pointers are vulnerable to
metadata corruption by store operations after unsafe typecast
operations on pointers. Hence, it is essential to check typecasts
to guarantee near-complete memory safety.
b) Tagged Pointers: To avoid fat pointers, several tech-
niques using embedded metadata employ tagged pointers in-
stead. SGXBounds [27] utilizes tagged pointers like FRAMER
and makes objects carry their metadata in a footer as shown
in Fig. 1b. In SGXBounds, a 64-bit pointer’s lower 32 bits
hold the address, and the higher 32 bits hold the referent
object’s upper bound, i.e. the location of the metadata footer.
The footer contains a lower bound (base), and may hold other
metadata. This approach works when there are enough spare
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Fig. 2: Disjoint Metadata
bits in pointers, which is the case with SGX enclaves, where
only 36 bits of virtual address space are currently supported.
Storing the absolute address of bounds frees SGXBounds from
false negatives/positives that challenge many object-tracking
approaches. The use of a footer provides fairly high locality
of references, and is less vulnerable to metadata corruption by
unsafe typecast than fat pointers.
Other techniques, such as Baggy Bounds Checking [3] and
Low-fat Pointers [28] use different compromises to support
larger address spaces without changing the pointer size.
2) Disjoint Metadata: Disjoint metadata achieves memory
layout compatibility by storing metadata in a separate memory
region. A high-level data structure, such as a hash table, sim-
plifies implementation and manipulation of metadata, however,
runtime overheads can be lower when using a shadow space
that allows direct array access to metadata [3], [8], [10],
[17], [33], [35], [40], [53]. Early techniques using shadow
spaces create a mirror copy of application space, i.e. byte-to-
byte mapping, but more recent techniques reduced the size
of shadow space with compact encoding, re-arranging objects
and so on.
SoftBound [33] is a pointer-based approach that uses either
a hash table and shadow space, while ensuring compatibility
and protecting sub-objects, and shows that the use of shadow
space reduces runtime overhead, on average, by 2/3 compared
with using table lookup [32].
Baggy bounds checking (BBC) [3] is an object-based ap-
proach that includes an implementation using shadow memory
that maps fixed-sized memory blocks to one byte-sized entries
in shadow space. BBC re-arranges objects and aligns them to
the base of a block, to prevent metadata conflicts caused by
multiple objects in one block. BBC pads each object to the
next power of two, so that each shadow table entry stores
only the binary logarithm of the padded object size. These
significantly reduce the size of the shadow space, but perform
approximate bounds checking, that tolerates pointers going
out-of-bounds yet within the padded bound.
Address Sanitizer [41] (ASan) utilizes shadow space in a
different way. It pads each object with redzone(rz) front and
back (Fig. 2a), and considers access to this rz as out-of-bounds.
The errors (i.e. access to rz) are identified by the value in the
corresponding entry in the shadow. At memory access, ASan
derives the address of its corresponding entry from a pointer,
and the entry tells if the address is addressable or not. ASan
maps 8 bytes in application space into one byte in shadow
space, and values in the bytes are written at object allocation.
ASan also detects some dangling pointers, by forcing freed
objects to stay in a so-called quarantine zone for a while.
Disadvantage of ASan is that its error detection relies on
spatial or temporal distance. It loses track of pointers going
far beyond of rz and reaching another object’s valid range, so
fails to address false negatives caused by violation of intended
referents. The wider the rz, the more errors ASan detects.
use-after-free errors cannot be detected, in the cases where
dangling pointers are used to access objects after the pointer
is freed from the quarantine. ASan detects most errors, but it
is less deterministic in theory.
Disjoint memory ranges can offer protection from metadata
manipulation, ranging from surrounding the memory area with
unmapped pages and randomizing its base address, to range
checking all memory accesses.
C. Hardware-based Approaches
Instruction set extensions for bounds checking [10], [19],
[28], [38], [51] have been proposed to overcome runtime
overheads and limitations of software-based approaches. Intel
MPX [19], [32], [37] is an ISA extension that provides a
hardware-accelerated pointer checking using disjoint metadata.
MPX has four registers: one holds a pointer itself, two for
upper and lower bounds, and the last register keeps a copy
of the pointer. If there is a mismatch between a pointer and
the copy, MPX considers the pointer has been updated in un-
instrumented code and gives up tracking of the pointer. This
mechanism provides incremental deployment and seamless in-
tegration of codes. Reportedly, the MPX approach suffers due
to lack of memory even with small working sets [27] and has
turned out to be slow for pointer-intensive programs, owing
to the restricted number of special-purpose bounds registers
(4 registers) is soon exceeded, requiring spill operations from
regions of memory that themselves require management and
consume D-cache bandwidth and capacity.
III. FRAMER APPROACH
In this section we provide a high-level description of
how FRAMER handles per-object metadata efficiently. In a
nutshell, the idea is to place per-object metadata close to
its object (normally in a header) and streamline metadata
lookup by calculating the location from only (1) an inbound
pointer and (2) additional information tagged in the otherwise
unused, top 16 bits. We exploit the fact that relative addresses
can be encoded in far fewer bits than absolute addresses
provided there is assistance from the memory manager to
restrict the distance between the allocation for an object
and a separate object for its metadata. In many cases, the
metadata can be stored in front of the object, essentially as a
header, requiring only a single memory manager allocation.
The relative distance between object and metadata is then
normally sufficiently small to be encoded in relative form in
the top 16 bits. But there are cases where relative location
information cannot be used, such as when allocating large
objects or with some small objects depending on their absolute
address, to avoid imposing alignment constraints on them. We
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Fig. 3: Aligned frames in memory space
use a supplementary table only for these cases. The top 16 bits
encode when this is the case, and also sufficient information
to locate the supplementary entry.
We are now going to present the concept of frames. In
Section III-C we thoroughly present how metadata are actually
stored for each different object.
A. Frame Definitions
FRAMER stores metadata for all objects in separate blocks
that are placed nearby by FRAMER’s memory manager. User
blocks are unchanged in layout, but their metadata can be
accessed with minimal additional cache misses. We record a
mapping between a block and its metadata using the top 16
bits of a 64-bit pointer, which are spare in contemporary CPUs.
As we show below, the code to resolve the metadata address
from the inbound pointer is very fast. It does not involve any
time-consuming traversal/lookup for metadata access.
To record the relative offset between a block and its meta-
data we define a logical structure over the whole data space
of a process, including statics, stack, and heap. The FRAMER
structures are based on the concept of frames, defined as
memory blocks that are 2n-sized and aligned by their size,
where n is a non-negative integer. A frame of size 2n is called
n-frame. A memory object x will intrinsically lie inside at least
one bounding frame, and x’s wrapper frame is defined as the
smallest frame completely containing x inside. For instance,
in Fig. 3, objects a,b and c’s wrapper frames are (n = 1)-
frame (or 1-frame), 4-frame, and 3-frame, respectively. For
0 ≤m<n, we call m-frames placed inside a n-frame f, f’s
subframes.
Frames have several interesting properties. Firstly, a n-frame
is aligned by 2m for all m < n. Secondly, an object’s wrapper
frame size need not grow in proportion to the object’s size. As
shown in Fig. 3, the object b has a larger wrapper frame than
c, even though b’s size is smaller. This is because the wrapper
frame size for an object is determined by both the object’s size
and location. Thirdly, a memory object x’s wrapper frame is a
frame containing x in it, and having the base (i.e. lower bound)
and upper bound of x in its lower-addressed (n− 1)-subframe
and higher-addressed (n − 1)-frame, respectively. It is trivial
to prove this as presented in Appendix 0a.
Following basic malloc semantics, FRAMER does not
natively support object movement or growth (we reset its
wrapper frame at realloc). Therefore, there exists the
unique wrapper frame for each object, and it is determined
at memory allocation. We use it as a reference point to obtain
relative location information for each object, since it does
not change during the life time of the object. At memory
allocation, we determine the wrapper frame for the allocated
object and tag the relative location in the pointer using the
wrapper frame size.
B. Frame Selection
Now we show how to get the size of the wrapper frame,
given an object. We call an object whose wrapper frame is
n-frame an n-object. For any k-object o, its wrapper frame
(i.e., k-frame) is aligned by 2k by definition, addresses of all
the bytes in the frame have the same value setting of most
significant (64− k) bits, and so do the addresses of all bytes
in o. In addition, the base and upper bound are located in the
lower and higher-addressed (k − 1)-frame, respectively. This
means that the (k − 1)th least significant bit of the base and
upper bound must be negated.
Based on these, we can get k, log2 of the size of o’s wrapper
frame. Let’s say (b63, ..., b1, b0) and (e63, ..., e1, e0) are bit
vectors of k-object o’s base and upper bound respectively, and
X is a don’t care value. We get the log2(wrapper frame size)
by performing XOR (exclusive OR) and CLZL (count leading
zeros) operations as follows (b63 is the most significant):
(b63, ..., bk, b(k−1), b(k−2), ..., b0)
(e63, ..., ek, e(k−1), e(k−2), ..., e0) XOR
(0, ..., 0, 1, X, ..., X) CLZL
(64− k)
We then get k by subtracting the result of clzl operation
from 64: 64− (64− k) = k.
C. Metadata Storage Management
As said, FRAMER stores metadata per object at an address
that can be derived from a tagged pointer. Objects carry their
metadata in a header associated with themselves. We encode
the relative location of metadata using the wrapper frame size
of each object. Assuming the header has a size of h, the base
address of the object is the header address plus h bytes, hence,
the base of an object does not need to be stored for bounds
checking. For instance, in Fig. 5, a, b and c are all objects
containing a h-sized header.
FRAMER considers two core types of objects, depending
on their wrapper frame size, namely small-framed and big-
framed objects, and re-structures the virtual address space as
follows. FRAMER divides user space into slots with a fixed
size of 215 bytes and aligned to their size, i.e., (N = 15)-
frames. Slots are set to a size of 215 so that the offset to the
header of small-framed objects ((N ≤ 15)-objects) can be
encoded in the unused 15 bits of a pointer. In Fig. 5, da is the
offset to the header of the small-framed object a. Typically, we
expect the number of big-framed objects to be low compared
to small-framed objects.
One extra bit, in particular the most significant, is taken for
the flag property, which indicates if the object is small-framed
or big-framed ((N > 15)-objects) as shown in Fig. 4.
flag tag address
1
0
offset
N
if N<=15
if N>15
48151
Fig. 4: Tagged Pointer: the tag depends on the value of N (binary
logarithm of the wrapper frame size of a referent object).
The descriptor of big-framed objects requires more bits
of information (described in III-C2). For big-framed objects,
FRAMER creates one array – can be interpreted as shadow
space – that holds additional location information. The corre-
sponding entry of a big-framed object is then directly accessed
only with a tagged pointer. We stress here that this array is
not needed for lookups associated with small-framed objects,
and is smaller than typical shadow memory implementations
where each entry corresponds to an aligned memory word.
1) Small-framed Objects: Since small-framed objects are
placed in a single slot, we simply tag a pointer with the offset
from the base address of the slot to the header of the object.
We further turn on the most significant bit of the pointer to
indicate that the particular object is small-framed. When we
retrieve metadata from a header of an small-framed object,
(i.e., flag==1) inbound (in-slot) pointers are derived to the base
of the slot by zeroing the least significant 15 (log2(slot size))
bits, and then to the address of the header by adding the offset
to the base address of the slot as follows:
FLAG_MASK = ˜(1ULL << 63);
offset = (tagged_ptr & FLAG_MASK) >> 48;
slotbase = untagged_ptr & (˜0ULL << 15);
header_addr = slotbase + offset;
obj_base = header_addr + header_size;
2) Big-framed Objects: Big-framed objects span several
slots, thus their offset cannot be solely used as their relative
location. Zeroing the least 15 significant bits (log slotsize) of
a pointer does not always lead to a unique slot base. In Fig. 5,
an object b’s inbound pointer can derive two different slots
(slot0 and slot1) depending on the pointer’s value, and
that is the case for object c (slot1 and slot2). Hence,
for big-framed objects, we need to store additional location
information in our supplementary table.
During program initialisation, we create an array, and each
entry is mapped to a 16-frame. We call such a frame a division.
Each entry contains one sub-array and the sub-array per
division is called a division array. Each division array contains
the fixed number of entries in the current implementation as
follows:
typedef struct Entries {
void *header_addr; /* The header address */
} EntryT;
typedef struct ShadowTableEntries {
EntryT division_array[48]; /* 64-16 */
} DivisionT;
Contrary to small-framed objects, we tag binary logarithm
of their wrapper frame size (i.e. N==log22
N ) in pointers to
big-framed objects. The address of an entry in a division array
slot0215 slot1 slot2
216 division0 division1
217 17-frame0
... b
0
c
1 2
...
4748 0
...
a b c
da |h| |ta|
division0’s array division1’s
Fig. 5: Access to division array: the object a is small-framed, while
b and c are big-framed. da is the offset to a. h denotes a header and
|ta| is the size of a. b and c’s entries are mapped to the same division
array. The entries in the division arrays store their corresponding
object’s header location, while the small-framed object a does not
have an entry. Only one entry of division1’s array is actually used,
since the division is not aligned by 217.
is then calculated from an inbound pointer and the N value,
and the entry holds the address of a header. By definition,
a wrapper frame of an (N ≥ 16)-object is aligned by its
size, 2N , therefore, the frame is also aligned by 216. This
implies that a (N ≥ 16)-frame shares the base address with
certain division, and is mapped to one division. In addition,
each object has an intrinsic N -value, since each object has
one wrapper frame. Each 216 frame is mapped to one division
array, so we keep the header address of each (N ≥ 16)-object
in one of entries of the division array.
Each (N ≥ 16)-object maps to one division array, but that
division array contains entries for multiple big-framed objects.
In Fig. 5, both division0 and 17-frame0 are mapped
to division0. Their mapped division (division0) is
aligned by 217 at minimum, while division1 is aligned
by 216 at max.
Here, the tag N is used as an index to identify big-framed
objects mapped to the same division array. For each N ≥ 16,
at most one N -object is mapped to one division array, and the
proof is presented in Appendix 0b. We use the value N as an
index of a division array, and tag N in the pointer. Given a
N value-tagged pointer (flag==0), we derive the address of
an entry as follows:
/* Ubase: division base of userspace’s base
scale: binary log (division_size), i.e. 16
TABLE: address of a supplementary table */
/* p is assumed untagged here */
framebase = p & (˜0ULL << N);
TABLE_index = (framebase - Ubase) / (1ULL << scale);
DivisionT *M = TABLE + TABLE_index;
EntryT *m = M->division_array;
EntryT *myentry = m + (N - scale);
header_addr = myentry->header_addr;
The base of the wrapper frame (i.e. the base of the division)
is obtained by zeroing the least significant N bits of the
pointer. We, then, get the address to its division array from
the distance from the base of virtual address space and
Ccode
static
lib
LLVM
IR
object
files
binary
lib
hardened
executable
FRAMER passes
other passes
linkLLVM/CLANG
FRAMER
Fig. 6: Overall architecture of FRAMER
log2(division size) (2
16). Finally we access the correspond-
ing entry with the index N in the division array.
Entries in a division array may not always be used, since
an entry corresponds to one big-framed object, which is not
necessarily allocated at any given time, e.g. if object b is not
allocated in the space in Fig. 5, 0th element of division0’s
array would be empty. This feature is used for detecting
some dangling pointers, and more details are explained in
section V-B.
Unlike existing approaches using shadow space, FRAMER
does not re-align objects to avoid conflicts in entries. Our
wrapper frame-to-entry mapping allows wrapper frames to be
overlapped, that gives full flexibility to memory manager.
We could use different forms of a header such as a remote
header or a shared header for multiple objects, with consider-
ing a cache line, stack frame, or page. In addition, although we
fixed the division size (216), future designs may offer better
flexibility in size, as long as entries are not overlapped.
We showed how to directly access per-object metadata
only with a tagged pointer. Our approach eliminates expen-
sive traversal in the data structure; gives great flexibility to
associate metadata with each object; gives full freedom to
arrange objects in memory space, that removes re-alignment of
objects unlike existing approaches using shadow space. This
mechanism can be exploited for other purposes: the metadata
can hold any per-object data.
IV. FRAMER IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes the current implementation of
FRAMER which is largely built using LLVM. Additionally,
we discuss how we offer compatibility with existing code.
A. Overview
There are three main parts to our implementation: FRAMER
LLVM passes, and the static library (lib), and the binary
lib in the dashed-lined box as shown in Fig. 6. The target
C source code and our hooks’ functions in the static lib
are first compiled to LLVM intermediate representation (IR).
Our main transformation pass instruments memory allocation,
deallocation, memory access, or optionally pointer arithmetic
in the target code in IR. In general, instrumentation simply
inserts a call to lib functions, performing metadata update
or bounds checking, however, our using of header-attached
objects and tagged pointers requires extra program transfor-
mation at compile-time. The third part is wrappers around
malloc family routines and string functions. Compiler opti-
mizations are discussed in Section VI.
The flexible structure of LLVM allowed these to be im-
plement using function interposition and two additional IR
traversals, but we also had to modify the LLVM framework
slightly. Our main transformation is implemented as a LLVM
Link Time Optimization (LTO) pass for whole program anal-
ysis, and run as a LTO pass on gold linker [31], however,
incremental compilation is also possible.
We also insert a prologue that is performed on program
startup. The prologue reserves address space for the supple-
mentary metadata table, and pages are allocated on demand.
B. Transformation of Memory Allocation
We instrument memory allocation and deallocation to up-
date metadata, and also transform the target IR code at compile
time for a header and tagged pointer.
1) Stack-allocated Objects (address-taken locals): In im-
plementation of a header-attached object, FRAMER’s trans-
formation pass creates a new object in a structure type, that
has two fields: a header’s type and the same type as the original
allocation as shown below:
struct __attribute__((packed)) newTy {
HeaderTy hd;
Ty obj; /* Ty is an original object’s type */
};
It then inserts a callsite to our hook function at allocation.
The hook decides if it is small or big-framed, updates metadata
in the header, and also in the entry for big-framed objects. It
then creates a tag (offset or N value), and moves the pointer
to the second field whose type is the actual allocated type in
the target program. The hook returns a tagged pointer. The
allocation of an original object is removed by FRAMER’s
pass, after the pass replaces all the pointers to the original
object with the tagged pointer to the new object.
We instrument function epilogues to reset entries for big-
framed non-static objects. Currently we instrument all the
epilogues, but this instrumentation can be removed for better
performance.
2) Statically-allocated objects (address-taken globals):
Transformation on static objects (global variables) is similar to
handling local ones on the stack. Creating a new global object
with a header attached is straightforward, however, other parts
of implementation are more challenging.
Some operations on stack objects (decision of a wrapper
frame size, creating a tag, updating metadata, and tagging
a pointer) are performed in the hook, and the role of the
transformation pass is to replace all the pointers to an orig-
inal object with the return value of the hook (i.e. a tagged
one). This cannot be applied to global objects, since the
return value of a function is non-constant, while the original
pointer’s users having it as an operand may be constant. For
example, an original pointer (compile-time constant), may be
an initializer of other global/static objects, or an operand of
some constant expression (LLVM ConstExpr) [30].
Global variables’ initializer and ConstExpr’s operands must be
constant, hence, the operations performed in a hook for stack
objects should be done by a transformation pass for global
objects.
In addition, while the tag should be generated at compile-
time, the wrapper frame size is determined by their actual
addresses on memory, that are known only at run-time. To
implement a tagged pointer generated from run-time informa-
tion at compile-time, FRAMER’s transformation pass builds
ConstExpr of (1) the wrapper frame size N (2) offset, (3) tag
and flag selection depending on its wrapper frame size, (4)
pointer arithmetic operation to move the pointer to the second
field, and then finally (5) constructs a tagged pointer based
on them. The original pointers are replaced with this constant
tagged pointer. The concrete value of the tagged pointer is
then propagated at run-time, when the memory addresses for
the base and bound are assigned.
FRAMER inserts a call to a function at the entry of main
function for each object. The function updates metadata in
the header and the address in the entry, for big-framed ones,
during program initialisation.
3) Heap objects: We interpose calls to malloc,
realloc, and calloc at link time with wrapper functions
in our binary libraries. The wrappers add the user-defined size
by the header size; call malloc and realloc; and the rest of
operations are the same as the hook for stack objects. calloc
takes the number of elements and the size of an element, so
we add minimum number of elements to hold the header (This
allows spare bytes at the end of the object).
We also interpose free with our wrapper. This performs
resetting an entry for a big-framed object, and releasing the
object with the hidden base (i.e. the address of the header).
C. Memory Access
FRAMER’s transformation pass inserts a call to our bounds
checking function right before each store and load, such
that each pointer is examined and its tag stripped-off before
being dereferenced. The hook extracts the tag from a pointer,
gets the header location, performs the check using metadata
in the header, and then returns an untagged pointer after
cleaning the tag. The transformation pass replaces a tagged
pointer operand of store/load with an untagged one to
avoid segmentation fault caused by dereferencing it.
Bounds checking and tag cleaning are also performed on
memcpy, memmove and memset in similar way. (Note that
LLVM overrides the C lib functions to their intrinsic func-
tions [29]). memmove and memcpy has two pointer operands,
so we instrument each argument separately.
As for string functions, we interpose these at link time.
Wrapper functions performs checking on strings, call real
functions with pointers with a tag removed, and then restore
tagged pointers.
D. Interoperability
FRAMER ensures compatibility between instrumented
modules and regular pointer representation in pre-compiled
Original C Instrumented C
1 struct newTy{HeaderTy hd;int A[10];};
2 int A[10]; struct newTy new_A;
3 tagged = handle_alloc(&new_A, A_size);
/* tagged = tag & &(new_A->A[0]),
A_size = sizeof(int) * 10 */
4 int *p; int *p;
5 p = A+idx; p = tagged + idx;
6 check_inframe(tagged, p);
7 untagged_p =
check_bounds(p, sizeof(int));
8 *p = val; *untagged_p = val;
TABLE I: FRAMER inserts code, highlighted in gray, for creating
a header-padded object, updating metadata and detecting memory
corruption. Codes in line 2, 5, and 8 in the first column are
transformed to codes in the second column.
non-instrumented libraries. We strip off tagged pointers before
passing them to non-instrumented functions.
FRAMER adds a header to objects for tracking, but this
does not introduce incompatibility, since it does not change
the internal memory layout of objects or pointers.
V. FRAMER APPLICATIONS
In this section we discuss how FRAMER can be used for
building security applications. We focus mainly on spatial
safety. Nevertheless, we discuss additional case studies related
to temporal safety and type checking.
A. Spatial Memory Safety
In a nutshell, FRAMER tracks individual memory alloca-
tions, and associates metadata with them. The metadata is
stored in the header associated with an object, and the offset,
or the wrapper frame information (N value), is tagged in the
pointer. We update the metadata and tag at object allocation;
metadata is retrieved at memory access (store, load and
selected standard library functions). The tagged pointers must
be stripped of their tag before being dereferenced to prevent
segmentation fault. Unlike other object-tracking or relative
location-based approaches, FRAMER can tackle legitimate
pointers outside the object bounds without padding objects
or requiring metadata retrieval or bounds checking at pointer
arithmetic operations.
In this section, we describe how FRAMER performs bounds
checking at run-time.
1) Memory allocation: As described in Section IV-B, a
header is prepended to memory objects (lines 1, 2 in Table I).
For spatial safety, this header must hold at least the raw object
size, but can hold additional information such as a type id.
This could be used for additional checks for sub-object bounds
violations or type confusion, but we do not experiment with
these in this work.
struct HeaderTy {
unsigned size;
unsigned type_id; /* Suggested for other
applications */
}
struct __attribute__((packed)) newTy {
HeaderTy hd;
Ty obj; /* Ty is an original object’s type */
};
An object’s base address is obtained by adding
sizeof(headerTy) to the header address, once we
get the header address from a tagged pointer.
Once a new object is allocated, an instrumented function
(handle_alloc) updates metadata, moves the pointer to
(new_A->A), and then tags it (line 3). The pointer to the
removed original object is replaced with a tagged one (A to
tagged in line 5).
2) Pointer arithmetic: Going out-of-bounds at pointer arith-
metic is not memory corruption as long as they are not
dereferenced. However, skipping checks at pointer arithmetic
can lose track of pointers’ intended referents. Memory access
to these pointer can be seen valid in many object bounds-
based approaches. To keep track of intended referents, object-
tracking approaches may have to check bounds at pointer
arithmetic [23]. However, performing bounds checks only at
pointer arithmetic may therefore cause false positives, where
a pointer going out-of-bounds by pointer arithmetic is not
dereferenced as follows:
int *p;
int *a = malloc(n * sizeof(int));
for (p = a; p < &a[100]; p++) *p = 0;
On the exit of for loop, p goes out-of-bounds yet is not
dereferenced – this is not an error in C standard. [3] handles
this by marking the pointers during pointer arithmetic, and
sending errors when dereferenced, or padding an object by
off-by-one byte, causing most of the false positives [23].
Instead of padding, we include one imaginary off-by-one
byte (or multiple bytes) when deciding the wrapper frame (see
Section III-B) on memory allocation. The fake padding then is
within the wrapper frame, and pointers to this are still derived
to the header, even when they land another object by pointer
arithmetic. The biggest advantage of fake padding is that it is
allowed to be overlapped with neighboring objects. The fake
padding does not cause conflict of N value with another object
on the supplementary table possibly overlapping the bytes.
FRAMER tolerates pointers to the padding at pointer
arithmetic, and reports errors on attempts to access them.
FRAMER detects those pointers being dereferenced, since
bounds checking at memory access retrieves the raw size of
the object.
Currently FRAMER adds fake padding only in the tail of
objects, but it could be also attached at the front to track
pointers going under lower bounds.
Above utilizing fake padding, to make a stronger guarantee
for near-zero false negatives, we could perform in-frame
checking (currently disabled) at pointer arithmetic (line 6 in
Table I). We can derive the header address of an intended
referent, as long as the pointer stays inside its wrapper
frame (slot for small-framed), in any circumstance. In Fig. 7,
consider a pointer (p), and its small-framed referent (a).
Assuming p going out-of-bounds to p’ by pointer arithmetic,
p’ even violates its intended referent, but p’ is still within
slot0. Hence, p’ is derived to a’s header by zeroing lower
log2(slot size) (15) bits and adding offset. This is applied
the same for big-framed objects.
214
215 slot0 slot1
216 16-frame0
a b
p p’ p"
offset
Fig. 7: By pointer arithmetic, a pointer p goes out-of-bounds (p’),
and also violates its intended referent (a to b). FRAMER still can
keep track of its referent, since p’ is in-frame. p" is out-of-frame,
which we catch at pointer arithmetic.
Hence, we could check only out-of-frame (p" in Fig. 7) by
performing simple bit-wise operations (no metadata retrieval)
checking if p and p’ are in its wrapper frame (or slot for
small-framed).
/* N: log2 wrapper_frame_size (or slot_size)*/
is_inframe = (p’ ˆ p) & (˜0ULL << N);
assert(is_inframe == 0);
FRAMER’s only false positives are out-of-frame pointers
getting back in-frame without being dereferenced, which is
very rare. Those uses will be usually optimised away by
compiler above optimisation level -O1, and normally the
distance between an object’s and its wrapper frame’s bounds
is large.
3) Memory access: As mentioned in Section IV-C, we
instrument memory access by replacing pointer operands with
a return of our hook, so that the pointers are verified and tag-
stripped, before being dereferenced (line 7,8 in Table I).
check_bounds first reads a tagged pointer’s flag telling
if the object is small or big-framed. As we described in
Section III-C1 and III-C2, we derive the header address from
either an offset or an entry, and then get an object’s size from
the header and its base address as follows:
obj_base = header_addr + sizeof(HeaderTy);
obj_size = (HeaderTy *)header_addr->size;
We then check both under/overflows ((1) and (2) below, re-
spectively). Detection of underflows is essential for FRAMER
to prevent overwrites to the header.
assert(untagged_p >= obj_base); /* (1) */
assert(untagged_p + sizeof(T) - 1
<= upperbound)); /* (2) */
/* Where T is the type to be accessed */
The assertion (2) aims at catching overflows and memory
corruption caused by access after unsafe typecast such as the
following example:
char *p = malloc(10);
int *q = p + 8;
*q = 10; // memory corruption
In a similar fashion, we instrument memcpy, memmove,
memset, and string functions (strcpy, strncmp,
strncpy, memcmp, memchr and strncat). Handling
individual function depends on how each function works. For
instance, strcpy copies a string src up to null-terminated
byte, and src’s length may not be equal to the array size
holding it. As long as the destination array is big enough to
hold src, it is safe, even if the source array is bigger than
the destination array. Hence, we check if the destination size
is not smaller than strlen(src), returning the length up
to the null byte as follows:
char *__wrap_strcpy(char *dst, char *src)
{ /* Strip off a pointer’s tag to pass it
to an external lib function (strlen) */
char *untagsrc = (char *)untag_ptr(src);
size_t srclen = strlen(untagsrc);
/* Check if dest array size is not smaller
than the lengh of src string */
__real_strcpy((char *)check_bounds(dst, srclen),
untagsrc);
return dst;
}
On the other hand, strncpy copies a string up to user-
specified n bytes, so we check both sizes of destination and
source arrays are bigger than n. Metadata for both arrays are
retrieved for bounds checking unlike handling strcpy.
B. Temporal Memory Safety
Although our primary focus in this paper is spatial safety,
FRAMER can also detect some forms of temporal memory
errors [2], [11], [34], [42] that we now discuss briefly.
Each big-framed object is mapped to an entry in a division
array in the supplementary table, and the entry is mapped to
at most one big-framed object for each N . We make sure
an entry is set to zero whenever a corresponding object is
released. This way, we can detect an attempt to free an
already deallocated object (i.e. a double free), by checking if
the entry is zero. Access to a deallocated object (i.e. use-after-
free) is detected in the same way during metadata retrieval
for a big-framed object. Note that this cannot detect invalid
temporal intended referents, i.e., an object is released, a new
object mapped to the same entry is allocated, and then a
pointer attempts to access the first object.
Detection of dangling pointers for small-framed objects is
out of scope of current implementation.
C. Type Cast Checking
The majority of type casts in C/C++ programs are either
upcasts (conversion from a descendant type to its ancestor
type) or downcasts (in the opposite direction). Upcasts are
considered safe, and this can be verified at compile time, since
if a source type of upcasts is a descendant type, then the type
of the allocated object at runtime is also a descendant type.
In contrast, the target type of downcasts may mismatch
the run-time type (RTT). If an allocated object’s type is
a descendant type of the target type at downcast, access
to an object after downcasts may cause boundary overruns
including internal overflows. This is a vulnerability commonly
known as type confusion [16], [21], [24], [25]. The RTT is
usually unknown statically due to inter-procedural data flows,
so downcasts require run-time checking to prevent this type
confusion.
RTT verification is more challenging than upcast checking
at compiler-time, since it requires pointer-to-typemapping. We
need to track individual objects (or pointers) and store per-
object (pointer) type information in the database. In addition,
RTT checking requires mappings of unique offsets to fields
corresponding to types of sub-objects. FRAMER could be the
basis of metadata storage (mapping a pointer to per-object
type) with supplementary type descriptors. FRAMER’s header
can hold corresponding per-object type layout information
(i.e. a list of types at each offset in the object type) or
its type ID for the object, and all type layout information
and type-compatibility relations can be stored in the type
descriptors (implementations can vary). FRAMER’s current
implementation as an LTO pass makes it easier to collect all
used types of the whole program.
Downcasts may be critical for approaches using embedded
metadata (Section II-B1), since memory writes after unsafe
type casts on program’s user data can pollute metadata in a
neighboring object’s header. Prevention of metadata corruption
is easier with FRAMER than with fat pointers. We can
detect memory overwrites to another object’s header caused by
downcasts by simply keeping track of structure-typed objects
and using our bounds checking. Unlike fat pointers, we do
not need to check internal overflows by unsafe downcasts to
protect metadata, since metadata is placed outside an object.
VI. OPTIMISATIONS
We applied both our customised and LLVM built-in op-
timisations. This section describes our own optimisations.
Suggestion of further optimisations is provided later in Sec-
tion VIII-B.
a) Implementation Considerations: As described in Sec-
tion IV-B2, all occurrences of an original pointer to a global
object are replaced with a tagged pointer created using a
constant expression (LLVM ConstExpr). Unfortunately, we
experienced runtime hotspots due to the propagation of the
tagging expression to every ConstExpr using the original
pointer. To work around this issue we created a helper global
variable for each global object, assigned the constant tagged
pointer to it during program initialisation, and then replaced
the occurrences of an original pointer with the corresponding
helper variable. This way, runtime overheads are reduced. For
instance, benchmark anagram’s overhead decreased from 14
seconds to 1.7 seconds.
b) Non-array Objects: We do not track non-array objects
that are not involved with pointer arithmetic, e.g., int-typed
objects. It is redundant to perform bounds checking or un-
tagging for pointers to them. We filter out simple cases, easily
recognised, from being checked. In the general case, it is
not trivial to determine if a pointer is untagged at compile
time, since back-tracing the assignment for the pointer requires
whole-program static analysis.
c) Safe Pointer Arithmetic: Instead of full bounds
checks, we only strip off tags for pointers involved in pointer
arithmetic and statically proven in-bound. For pointers where
the bounds can be determined statically, as in the following
Memory Runtime Dynamic IPC Load D-cache Branch B-cache
footprint (cycles) instructions density MPKI density MPKI
Baseline 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.70 0.28 24.85 0.19 2.85
Store-only 1.22 1.70 2.24 2.17 0.20 12.27 0.15 1.34
Full check 1.23 3.23 5.25 2.54 0.14 5.28 0.17 0.86
TABLE II: Summary averages over all benchmarks (first three columns normalised)
example, we insert only runtime bounds checks and avoid the
metadata retrieval:
int a[10];
... *(a + n) ...
d) Hoist Run-time Checks Outside Loops: Loop-
invariant expressions can be hoisted out of loops, thus im-
proving run-time performance by executing the expression
only once rather than at each iteration. We modified SAFE-
Code’s [12], [43] loop optimisation passes. We apply hoisting
checks to monotonic loops, and pull loop invariants that do
not change throughout the loop, and scalars to the pre-header
of each monotonic loop. While iterating our run-time checks
inside each loop including inner loops, we determine if the
pointer is hoistable. If hoistable, we place a scalar evolution
expression along with its run-time checks outside the loop,
and delete the old checks inside loop.
e) Inlining Function Calls in the Loop: Inlining func-
tions can improve performance, however it can bring more
performance degradation due to the bigger size of the code
(runtime checks are called basically at every memory access).
Currently, we only inline bounds checks that are inside loops
to minimise code size.
VII. EVALUATION
We measured the performance of FRAMER on C bench-
marks from the full set of Olden [7], Ptrdist [4], and a subset
of SPEC CPU 2006 [18]. For each benchmark we measured
four binary versions: un-instrumented, only store-checked and
full (both load and store checking enabled) on FRAMER, and
ASan. The same set of compiler optimisations in the same
order are applied to four versions. In addition, we disabled
ASan’s memory leak detection at run-time and halting on error
in order to force ASan to continue after error detection. This
is to measure overheads in the same setting as FRAMER. Bi-
naries were compiled with the regular LLVM-clang version
4.0 using optimisation level -O2. Measurements were taken on
an Intel R© Xeon R© E5-2687W v3 CPU with 132 GB of RAM.
Results were gathered using perf. Table II summarises the
average of metrics of the baseline and the two instrumented
tests.
In this text, cache and branch misses refer to L1 D-cache
misses and branch prediction misses both per 1000 instructions
(MPKI), respectively.
A. Memory Overhead
Our metadata header was a generous 16 bytes per object.
The big-frame array had 48 elements for each 16-frame
(division) in use where the element size was 8 bytes to hold
full address of the header. The header size and the number
of elements of each division array can be reduced, but this
is our early implementation. Currently all the header objects
were aligned by 16 for compatibility with the llvm.memset
intrinsic function that sometimes assumes this alignment.
Despite inflation of space using larger than needed headers
and division array entries and some changes of alignment, we
see FRAMER’s space overheads are very low at 1.22 and 1.23
as shown in Fig. 9. These measurements reflect code inflation
for instrumenting both loads and stores.
The memory overheads of FRAMER are low and stable
compared to other approaches [33], [41]. ASan’s average nor-
malised overheads are 8.84 (increase by 784%) for the same
working set in our experiments, and the highest and lowest
overheads are 4766% for the test hmmer and 8% for sjeng,
respectively. The average memory overhead of FRAMER is
22% ∼ 23% for both store-only and full checking, and only
two tests, perlbench.2 (84%) and yacr2 (116%) recorded
comparably higher growth than other tests. The two tests
produce many small-sized objects, for example, perlbench
allocates many 1-byte-sized heap objects. Currently FRAMER
instruments every heap object, so attaching a 16-byte-sized
header to all the 1-byte-sized objects made the increase higher.
FRAMER’s overheads for those benchmarks are still much
lower than ASan’s: 2808% for perlbench.2 and 714% for
yarc2.
B. Slowdown
Fig. 8 reports the slowdown per benchmark (relative number
of additional cycles). The average is 70% for store-only and
223% for full checking.
Our performance degradation is mainly due to increased
dynamic instructions. For full-checking, anagram (410%)
and ks (452%) stand out for high overheads despite its smaller
program size, mostly due to heavy recursion and excessive
allocations causing big growth in executed instructions (674%
for anagram, 812% for ks) as shown in Fig. 11, but
decreases in cache misses are moderate (76% for anagram,
81% for ks) compared to average (decreased by 63%).
On contrast, mcf recorded the highest instruction overheads
(1097%), but cache misses (91%) and branch misses (92%) af-
ter instrumentation are dropped the biggest among all the tests,
so run-time overhead did not grow in proportion to increased
instruction count. perlbench and bzip sets’ overheads are
high in both FRAMER and ASan, and ASan recorded better
speed in the sets (perlbench: 405% (FRAMER) and 299%
(ASan), and bzip: 376% (FRAMER) and 63% (ASan)),
and especially in bzip group. Both perlbench and bzip
produce many objects, and especially bzip recorded much
higher growth in executed instructions for metadata updates
and checks than perlbench and others.
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Fig. 8: Normalised runtime overheads
bh
bis
ort em
3d
hea
lth ms
t
per
im
ete
r
pow
er
tre
ead
d tsp
vor
ono
i
ana
gra
m bc ft ks
yac
r2
per
lbe
nch
.1
per
lbe
nch
.2
per
lbe
nch
.3
per
lbe
nch
.4
bzi
p2.
1
bzi
p2.
2
bzi
p2.
3 gcc mc
f
hm
me
r
sje
ng
lib
qu
ant
um
h26
4re
f
1
2
5
10
14.0 20.3 16.6 15.1 29.1 12.5 17.5 48.7 17.1
Fig. 9: Normalised maximum resident set size
ASan (139%) showed better performance than FRAMER
(223%) on the full-checking mode on average. FRAMER was
faster than ASan for 9 tests among 28.
Performance was impacted far less than would naively be
expected from the additional dynamic instruction count (metric
columns 2 and 3 in Table II). The rise in IPC (column 4)
is quite considerable on average, although the figure varies
greatly by benchmark. The original IPC ranged from 0.22 to
3.20 but after instrumentation there was half as much variation.
C. Data Cache Misses
A primary goal of FRAMER is to allow flexible relation-
ships between object and header locality so that additional
cache misses from metadata access can be minimised. We do
not analyse L1 instruction cache miss rate since this gener-
ally has negligible performance effect on modern processors,
despite our slightly inflated code. To explain the measured
increase in IPC we analyse L1 D-cache misses MPKI (cache
misses) and branch prediction misses MPKI. The baseline D-
cache miss rate was 2.48% (Table II) but this improves with
FRAMER enabled owing to repeated access to the same cache
data.
In Fig. 10, we normalise cache misses to the uninstrumented
figure. The average normalised cache misses is 0.66 and
0.38 for store-only and full-checking, respectively. The miss
rate is reduced since the additional operations we add have
high cache affinity which dilutes the underlying miss rate of
the application. Moreover, cache misses after instrumentation
do not increase in proportion to increase in the number of
dynamic instruction.
In the full-check mode, cache misses increased only for two
test (48% for power and 1% for voronoi) on FRAMER,
while ASan showed increase for four tests. ASan’s normalised
misses on average is 0.73, which is higher than FRAMER’s
0.38. ASan’s highest overhead is 197% for bc, and two
tests reached increase more than by 100%. On FRAMER,
power’s overhead by 48% is mainly caused by the very
low increase in instruction executed in producing MPKI. The
rest of benchmarks’ misses except two tests decreased after
instrumentation, and normalised misses were below 0.5 for
21 tests among 28 working set for the full checking. As for
ASan, only 13 tests’ normalised misses were lower than 0.5. In
the store-only mode of FRAMER, the decrease is lower than
that of the full-checking, but still the half of tests’ normalised
misses are below 0.5. The overall cache miss rate showed
FRAMER is cache-efficient and stable.
D. Instructions Executed
FRAMER increases dynamic instruction count by 124% for
store-only, and 425% for full checking. Along with additional
data access for metadata manipulation, this increase in instruc-
tions executed is the main contributor to runtime overhead.
Our dynamic instruction penalty arises from setting up and
using tagged pointers. Certain operations are easily verified
at compile time. If all checking could be performed statically
there would be no runtime overhead. But FRAMER inserts
tags on all pointers and use sites that are readily checkable
at compile time still suffer run-time overhead from pointer
stripping operations since all major architectures require the
top bits to be zero (or special pointer authentication code
in ARM8) to avoid a segmentation fault. In addition, we
sometimes have to dynamically strip the tag field even for un-
tagged pointers, i.e. pointers to objects not tracked for bounds
checking when it is uncertain if the pointer is tagged or not.
The penalty of using tagged pointers is over-instrumentation
– unless individual memory access is proven safe statically,
we have to instrument (i.e. tag-cleaning) memory access to
avoid segmentation fault. Another major source of overheads
is arithmetic operations to calculate metadata locations. This
makes cache misses overheads per 1000 instructions (MPKI)
for full-checking lower than for store-only.
The average overhead for ASan is 226%, which is lower
than FRAMER. The average excluding the highest test (1336%
for bh) is 184%, while FRAMER’s average excluding the
highest (1098% for mcf) is 400%. The difference of slowdown
between FRAMER and ASan on average (FRAMER: 213%,
ASan: 139%) was not big as the difference of instruction
executed due to FRAMER’s cache efficiency.
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Fig. 10: Normalised L1 D-cache load misses per 1000 instructions (MPKI)
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Fig. 11: Normalised dynamic instruction count
In summary, ASan is more efficient in instructions executed.
ASan saves more dynamic instructions with using non-tagged
pointers (no tag cleaning) and shadow space-only metadata
storage that helps simpler derivation of metadata location, as
trade-off of high locality and space usage.
Future implementations can optimise the case where conser-
vative analysis reveals the tag never needs to be added. More
discussion on optimisation is described in Section VIII-B2.
E. Branch Misses
Additional conditional branches arise in FRAMER from
checking whether a big or small frame is used and in the
pointer validity checks themselves. Many approaches using
shadow space such as ASan may be more relieved from
these branches at metadata retrieval, and have them at bounds
checking using retrieved metadata.
As shown in Table II col 7, the dynamic branch density
decreases slightly under FRAMER instrumentation, but the
branch mis-prediction rate greatly decreases (col 8). The
averages of normalised branch misses for store-only and full-
checking are 0.62 and 0.42, respectively. This shows the
additional branches added achieve highly accurate branch
prediction and that branch predictors are not being overloaded.
Of the new branches added, the ones checking small/large
frame size are completely statically predictable owing to the
checking code instances being associated with a given object.
And the ones checking pointer validity also predict perfectly
since no out-of-bounds errors are detected.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Comparison with Other Approaches
1) Address Sanitizer: First of all, ASan is integrated into
Clang front end, whereas FRAMER is implemented as a
LLVM pass. ASan’s placement has better chances for min-
imal instrumentation and maximal optimisation of redundant
checks.
Taking advantage of shadow space, ASan’s calculation
of metadata retrieval and bounds checking is simpler than
FRAMER, saving executed instructions. ASan aligns an object
to 8 to avoid conflicts in entries, and maps every 8 byte
to its entry holding the first k bytes that are addressable.
This simplifies operations of bounds checking, but makes it
difficult to detect un-aligned memory access after unsafe type
cast. In addition, ASan pads each object 32 bytes at minimum
for redzone and extra 31 bytes for alignment, which burdens
space. On contrast, FRAMER’s fake padding and wrapper
frames do not consume space, allowing invading other objects’
territory. Just mind that adding excessive fake padding may
enlarge an object’s wrapper frame size, turning a small-framed
object into a big-framed one, that requires indirect memory
access to metadata.
Table III summarises the comparison of overheads between
ASan and FRAMER per benchmark. FRAMER showed higher
efficiency in space and L1 D-cache hit overall. ASan’s mem-
ory footprint is higher than FRAMER for the whole 28
benchmarks: increase by 23% for FRAMER’s full-checking
and 784% for ASan on average. ASan is based on shadow
space only, while FRAMER is mainly header-based, so the
evaluation showed that FRAMER is more cache-friendly:
ASan’s cache misses are higher than FRAMER except for six
benchmarks, and normalised cache misses on average are 0.38
for FRAMER and 0.73 for ASan. This shows that FRAMER’s
decrease in cache misses after instrumentation is much bigger.
On average, ASan showed better performance at run-time
performance and executed instructions. Normalised overheads
of cycle are 3.23 for FRAMER and 2.39 for ASan, and over-
heads of executed instructions are 5.25 (FRAMER) and 3.26
(ASan). Among the 28 benchmarks, FRAMER was faster for
9 tests, and showed less increase in dynamic instruction counts
for 8 tests. As shown in Table III, the benchmarks where ASan
is faster roughly match those with less instructions executed.
2) SGXBounds: Both SGXBounds and FRAMER are based
on tagged pointers. The main difference is that SGXBounds
uses 32 bits for a tag among 64 bits, while FRAMER tags
only upper spare 16 bits that are common. SGXBounds is not
applicable to many 64-bit machine.
SGXBounds’s retrieving an upper bound first not the base
(lower bound) like FRAMER, may save some overheads if
Benchmarks CL #I DC SP Benchmarks CL #I DC SP Benchmarks CL #I DC SP
bh 3.4 4.9 0.5 3.2 bisort 0.6 0.4 3.9 1.5 em3d 0.6 0.5 1.9 1.7
health 2.7 1.1 1.2 1.6 mst 0.6 0.3 3.7 1.7 perimeter 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
power 1.1 1.7 0.5 7.2 treeadd 1.4 1.5 0.6 1.2 tsp 0.7 0.4 3.1 1.5
voronoi 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.3 anagram 0.4 0.4 1.3 13.2 bc 1.9 1.5 5.4 19.4
ft 0.8 0.4 2.6 1.6 ks 0.4 0.3 2.9 14.8 yacr2 0.6 0.6 1.4 3.8
perlbench.1 0.8 0.7 2.6 13.6 perlbench.2 0.7 0.6 3.4 15.8 perlbench.3 0.7 0.5 7.1 10.8
perlbench.4 1.1 0.8 4.1 3.1 bzip2.1 0.3 0.3 3.8 1.6 bzip2.2 0.3 0.3 3.7 2.0
bzip 2.3 0.4 0.3 3.6 1.1 gcc 1.2 1.2 1.2 12.0 mcf 0.5 0.3 3.3 1.9
hmmer 1.1 1.6 0.8 44.4 sjeng 0.9 0.9 2.6 1.1 libquantum 1.4 1.4 0.8 14.8
h264ref 0.4 0.4 4.3 7.6 AVERAGE 0.74 0.62 1.93 7.19
TABLE III: Address Sanitizer’s normalised overheads divided by FRAMER’s (full-check): the columns are cycles (CL), instructions executed
(#I), L1 D-cache misses in MPKI (DC), and memory footprint (SP), respectively. The average is highlighted in light green in the last line.
we perform overflow-only checking, which is more com-
mon. However, using a footer makes systems slightly more
vulnerable to metadata pollution at the same time without
near complete memory safety. For both over/under underflow
checking, we do not consider our derivation of the base, not
the upper bound, as a weakness. In addition, FRAMER’s frame
encoding can be easily integrated to SGXBounds’ design.
3) MPX: In principle, FRAMER could utilize MPX for
a faster instrumentation when used for spatial safety. We
showed FRAMER is more cache-friendly, but it could be made
even faster if a single instruction implemented the complete
tag decode operation, splitting apart the tagged pointer into
an untagged object pointer and separate header pointer in
another register. This would be a fairly simple, register-to-
register instruction, operating on general purpose registers.
Since this has not used the D-cache, an enhancement would
be to compare the pointer against a bounds limit at hardcoded
offset loaded from the header, but the best design requires
further study.
4) Baggy Bounds and Low-Fat pointers: Baggy bounds [3]
re-aligns objects and adds padding to them to prevents conflicts
entries in shadow space. One of benefits of FRAMER is al-
lowance of wrapper frames being overlapped, which removes
both superfluous padding and metadata conflicts. In a similar
way, our frame-based encoding is less intrusive than Low-fat
pointers’ [28], that requires objects to be grouped and aligned
by their size.
B. Additional Optimisations
1) Runtime checks only at pointer arithmetic: We aligned
objects by 16 bytes at the moment due to llvm.memset intrinsic
function. On this alignment, we have spare 4 bits at the end
of offset for small-framed. (We already have spare bits for
big-framed ones.) Using the bits, we can mark out-of-bounds
pointers at pointer arithmetic, and report errors when they
are dereferenced. This way, we expect to remove duplicated
runtime checks, since the pointer may be used for memory
access multiple times.
2) Compiler Optimisation: There are more optimisations
we could use. Duplicate runtime checks can be eliminated us-
ing dominator tree. SoftBound [33] reported that their simple
dominator-based redundant check elimination improved per-
formance by 13% and claimed more advanced elimination [6],
[52] can reduce more overheads.
Loop optimization showed minor impact on reducing over-
heads, even for some SPEC benchmarks whose number of
hoisted run-time checks reached hundreds at static time. Our
naive optimization skipping untagging improved performance
more than state-of-the-art loop hoist pass. Static points-to
analysis [45], [46], as long as it does not assume the absence
of memory errors, potentially enables many tags and bounds
checks to be removed at compile time.
C. Hardware Implementation of FRAMER
We believe FRAMER’s encoding is at its best when it is
implemented as instruction set extensions. As briefly men-
tioned in VIII-A3, the increase in the number of executed
instructions, the main contributor to slowdown of FRAMER,
can be resolved with new instructions. Tag-cleaning would be
just one instruction. Moreover, decision of wrapper frame on
memory allocation or calculation of metadata locations from
tagged pointers can be implemented as a single instruction,
respectively.
In addition, hardware-based FRAMER can overcome
MPX’s overheads. MPX suffers from space overheads and
even crashes due to the limited space to store per-pointer
metadata in the bounds table, especially for pointer-intensive
programs. FRAMER’s per-object metadata in the header and
compact-size table can reduce the space. FRAMER’s tracking
objects also removes metadata updates at pointer assignment,
that causes performance loss of MPX.
IX. CONCLUSION
We designed, implemented and evaluated FRAMER, a
software capability model with object granularity. FRAMER
enables a variety of security applications for detecting memory
safety errors. Compared to existing approaches, our frame-
based offset encoding is more flexibile both in metadata asso-
ciation and memory management, while still offering a fairly
simple calculation to map from arbitrary pointers to meta-
data locations. In addition, its intrinsic memory and cache-
efficiency make it potentially attractive for direct hardware
support.
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APPENDIX
a) Proof 1: Given an object o and its wrapper frame f ,
let’s assume there exists a smaller frame x that has o inside.
Since o resides in both f and x, we can conclude that x is a
subframe of f . According to the assumption, the base address
of o (baseo) is within the range of x, hence, we get basex ≤
baseo. Here, f is o’s wrapper frame, so baseo is placed in
f ’s lower subframe. x is a subframe of f , hence x must be
f ’s lower subframe. This is resolved to contradiction between
the assumption (x has o inside) and the definition of wrapper
function (o’s upper bound in the upper subframe). Hence, we
can conclude that there is no smaller frame than o’s wrapper
frame; this is actually the unique wrapper frame, and it can
be used a reference point.
b) Proof 2: We prove that for each N , there exists at
most one N -object mapped to each entry of a division array,
and show N identifies an object mapped to the same division
array. To prove this, we assume there exist two distinctive
objects, x and y; both are N -objects (N ≥ 16) mapped to
the same division array. Since x and y are N -objects, their
wrapper frame (fx and fy) is 2
N -sized by definition. The
division is the only one that fx and fy are mapped to as
shown previously, so fx and fy have the same base address
as the division. In addition, both frames have the same size,
so they are identical. Both base addresses of x and y (bx, by)
must be in the lower (N −1)-subframe of fx (or fy), and end
addresses must be in the other sub-frame. From this, bx and
by must be smaller than ex and ey . However, the objects are
distinct, so bx < ex < by < ey or vice versa must hold. The
assumption leads to a contraction. We conclude that for each
N , there is a unique N -object mapped to one division array.
